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Abstract
By the late 1800s British colonial rule in Cyprus was experiencing both a socio-
economic and a legitimacy crisis. Britain’s development projects were intended to
quell the crisis and consolidate colonial authority. Famagusta Harbour construction
was an integral part of that programme, but it antagonised wealthy and influential
Cypriots in Larnaca. They believed that such infrastructure would undermine the
importance of Larnaca harbour and threaten their commercial and political interests.
Their protests threatened the colonial administration with a new crisis that was averted
by the integration of Larnaca’s Harbour into British plans. The colonial regime had to
negotiate and co-operate with local networks of power in order to realise its devel-
opment programme: harbour development was no mere rational engineering exercise.
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Introduction
By January 1908, traders of Larnaca could enjoy the extra space and safety of a
newly improved harbour – an enterprise undertaken solely by the colonial
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government. Thus, the steamer lines and vessels doing trade in the Levant and
Cyprus could still regard Larnaca a convenient port of call. The improvements in
Larnaca commenced right after the development of another Cyprus harbour – at
Famagusta – into a modern port served by a railway line. The expansion and
renovation of Larnaca port were neither motivated by imperial visions nor colonial
trade policies. Instead, its improvement was the product of events that pushed the
colonial Cyprus Government to a crisis which put its foundational institutions
under scrutiny.
Until the early twentieth century, Larnaca was the trade centre of the island of
Cyprus, whereas Famagusta was a relatively backward town on the east coast
without any significant political or economic influence. Yet the British chose
Famagusta as the port that should be invested in and developed into the major
harbour of the island. The Famagusta Harbour construction project occurred
between 1903 and 1906 and was based upon British technocratic practices in the
West African colonies. The practice of constructing railways stretching deep into
the hinterland and terminating at one port was translated in Cyprus as the dogma
of ‘one harbour-one railway’. The implementation of this dogma was anything but
straightforward. The Cyprus Government had to manoeuvre between the Colonial
Office, experts and local politicians, merchants and leading figures of bourgeois
society. Similarly, the story of Larnaca port improvements was one of politics,
mediation of expertise, trade-offs and compromises.
This research paper examines the establishment of coastal infrastructures in
colonial Cyprus in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It argues
that these were the results of a socio-political process of co-production of techno-
logical infrastructures and colonial political order – technological networks and
infrastructures that are politically and culturally embedded in colonial localities.1
With this methodological approach, the paper asks how colonial policies, engin-
eering priorities and local politics shaped transport policies and harbour design.
The paper also asks how Joseph Chamberlain’s colonial estate’s policy (which
emphasized state-driven infrastructure development projects) was implemented in
Cyprus.
The period 1895–1908 was marked by major infrastructural projects in Cyprus.
British colonial administration was seeking both local and metropolitan consent in
order to consolidate its control of the island. Colonial and imperial policy was led
by Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies from 1895 to 1903.
British imperial policy was transformed by his ‘colonial estates’ ideology which,
stressing ‘constructive imperialism’, emphasized the role of technological infra-
structures and scientific assistance for tropical agriculture.2 So too, this was a
period in which the British Empire began to feel competition from industrial
powers such as Germany and the USA. For this reason Joseph Chamberlain
supported policies that would boost local economies and make them key to the
economic prosperity of the British Empire.3
The term ‘constructive imperialism’ was coined to describe the colonial devel-
opment plans and projects during Joseph Chamberlain’s tenure. Primarily, the
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objective of his constructive imperialism was to serve British interests in decreasing
the expense of maintaining and defending a vast empire. This practical policy gave
importance to railway construction and presupposed the boosting of investment
and employment in British industry through orders for new railways. Railways
were considered a means of opening access to the hinterlands of the West
African Tropics, and a way of providing a counter-balance to the economic expan-
sion of the USA and Germany. The policy had a secondary objective. Self-
sufficient and autonomous colonial economies were thought to produce contented
colonial subjects and a stronger imperial defence. This was an intended conse-
quence for the colonies in Western Africa and the West Indies, and it was also
the case in Cyprus too.
The historian Andrekos Varnava has argued that Cyprus was unimportant to
the British Empire’s strategy or defence. Thus, as we show below, it had to be
protected not from another imperial force but from its own inner crisis and from
emerging criticism within the British Empire.4 British colonial authorities sought to
answer the social and economic crisis, and the growing crisis of colonial legitimacy
as it was experienced in the island, through economic development schemes that
included the construction of ports, railway networks and irrigation. In the process
of port construction, the local colonial administration5 found their strategies and
policies undermined by the political and economic elite in Cyprus.
Chamberlain’s policy for the management of the crisis had an unintended con-
sequence. It created further deterioration of the political situation which led to the
reconsideration of the two fundamental institutions of the British occupation: the
Tribute and the 1882 Constitution. The Tribute, a term used in the Cyprus
Convention of 1878, was an amount from the excess of Cyprus’ revenue over
expenditure. It had to be paid annually to the Sultan and amounted to approxi-
mately £92,000. On the other hand, the 1882 Constitution, the most liberal
amongst non-settler colonies, provided Cyprus its legal and administrative frame-
work while granting it the Legislative Council. The establishment of the Legislative
Council was significant because it opened a political space that contributed to the
expression of the political will of both communities despite its colonial structure.6
In order to consolidate their colonial establishment, the British had to negotiate,
co-operate and compromise with local networks of power whose vested interests in
Larnaca had been threatened by the construction of a new harbour and railway in
Famagusta. As Varnava suggests, the decision-making about Cyprus was not dir-
ected from the top of the British government but instead was filtered through state
departments and civil servants.7 We corroborate this argument by showing that the
imperial policy had to be negotiated and appropriated between the High
Commissioners, various engineers and the local elite. This fact forced the Cyprus
Government and the Colonial Office to improve the Larnaca port in order to
reproduce the existing political relations amongst the British and Cypriot ruling
elites. We show that the construction of the harbours of Famagusta and Larnaca
brought the governability of Cyprus under the existing relations and institutions
(the Tribute and the Legislative Council granted by the Gladstonian Constitution
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of 1882) of the island into question. Unlike the nationalist-induced governability
crisis of 1912, the Legislative Council and Tribute were placed under scrutiny by
the colonial establishment because of the vested interests of the Larnacan elites.8
The result was the improvement of the Larnaca harbour in a negotiated fashion
by the mediation of the engineers’ designs and an increase in grants-in-aid to the
island.
Cyprus as a show case of Chamberlain’s colonial agenda
In the years prior to 1895 – the year that Joseph Chamberlain began his work as the
Secretary of State for the Colonies – Cyprus had already been experiencing eco-
nomic and social decline. It had been a British protectorate since 1878 and British
occupation was followed by the gradual modernisation of state institutions on the
Island. The late 1880s and early 1900s were a period of crisis that has generally
been attributed to the dissolution of the Island’s long established legal, social,
political and economic institutions.9 British fiscal policy on the island (and par-
ticularly the taxation system) was severe and unpopular and led to rural indebted-
ness and dispossession.10 During the first decade of the twentieth century conflict
worsened, especially among the Muslim and Christian elites. The dissolution of
traditional hierarchies and authority within the two communities led to a decade of
political mobilisation, identity building and the creation of a new political author-
ity amongst traditional and populist elites. These elites (mostly clerics, merchants,
doctors, lawyers and large land-owners) dominated the spiritual, economic and
political life of the islanders’. The situation culminated in the inter-communal
crisis of 1912.11 Meantime, in 1896 Britain’s policy for Cyprus triggered a reaction
in London among some Members of Parliament. Conservatives and Gladstonian
Liberals alike believed that British rule in Cyprus was unfair and disgraceful.12 But
tensions were so high on the Island that Joseph Chamberlain condemned these
statements. He warned the British Parliament that people in Cyprus were ready to
accept ‘as gospel, statements of this kind, and assume that they are mistreated and
to be discontented in consequence’.13
By 1899 the Liberal Unionists under the leadership and influence of Joseph
Chamberlain developed the so-called ‘colonial estates’ policy as an attempt to
consolidate the Empire, increase the wealth of Britain and again become econom-
ically and politically competitive with the USA, Russia, and Germany.14 Besides
scientific assistance in agriculture, an essential aspect of Chamberlain’s colonial
policy was the construction of railways, a policy priority that influenced his strat-
egy in the context of Cyprus.15 His ‘undeveloped estate’ theory (colonies or pro-
tectorates without investment) foresaw an active role for the colonial government
in economic development, the encouragement of private investment, and the devel-
opment of railway networks.16 Despite the scepticism and the ambivalence of the
Treasury towards Chamberlain’s ‘constructive’ colonialism, Cyprus was one of
several colonies for which he managed to gain a Parliamentary vote in allocating
funds for projects.17 Cyprus, an island not famous for its natural resources,
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received a relatively large amount from the 1899 Colonial Loans Act (£314,000 of
the £3,500,000 available; 9.3 per cent of the whole amount). It was an amount
comparable to that received by vast colonies like the Malay States and Sierra Leone
(Table 1).
Consolidating colonialism: Famagusta harbour
as the entrepôt of the Levant
From the beginning of the British colonial period in Cyprus, Famagusta city and its
harbour occupied a romantic place in the British colonial mind. When the admin-
istration of Cyprus passed to Britain in 1878 from the Ottoman Empire (an out-
come of the Congress of Berlin in 1878) many British politicians and military men
began thinking about the strategic potential of the island for the Empire.
Famagusta Harbour in particular was conceived of as a potential coaling station
en route to India.18 However, the fall of Egypt, which brought the Port of
Alexandria under British control in 1881, combined with the insanitary conditions
of Famagusta and the economic restrictions upon Cyprus’s revenue, rendered the
viability of the proposal of a coaling station at Famagusta ‘out of the question’.19
Until 1900 Famagusta remained a peripheral, small and decaying port, whereas
Larnaca, Limassol, and Kyrenia underwent renovation and infrastructural
improvement.20 Meanwhile the city of Larnaca – the second largest city on the
island after Nicosia21 – became the naval and mercantile centre of Cyprus, and the
main port for Cyprus’s import and export trade.22 Larnaca was the home of
Cyprus’s powerful merchants, influential politicians, petit-bourgeoisie, foreign rep-
resentatives of embassies and banks, and a hub for many of the first nationalists.23
In 1899 Chamberlain’s development policy finally gave impetus to develop rela-
tively backward Famagusta port. It acquired a place in transport policy and was
defined as a naval and railway centre. The Colonial Development Welfare Act of
1899 would grant money to the Island to improve its inner and outer communi-
cations, and agricultural production. The general plan was to improve Cyprus’s
Table 1. Colonial loans allocated under the Colonial Loans Act 1899.a
Name of colony or place Purpose of loan Maximum loan (£)
Cyprus Harbour, railway and irrigation 314,000
Gold Coast Railways, Accra Harbour Works 676,000
Jamaica Public works, railways, misc. 453,000
Malay States Railways 500,000
Lagos Railways 792,500
Sierra Leone Railways 310,000
aCyprus is the only non-tropical colony in the list.
Source: Data compiled from D. Sunderland, Managing the British Empire, The Crown Agents 1833–1914 (London,
Boydell Press & The Royal Historical Society, 2004).
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agricultural capabilities and boost its grain and fruit exports to neighbouring
countries, Egypt being the most important. Irrigation and railway infrastructure
was intended to facilitate the trade of products from the fertile Messaoria plain in
the centre of the Island to these neighbouring countries. The choice of Famagusta
was straightforward because the British colonial mind was biased from the first
days of island’s occupation. As a city, Famagusta had historic and symbolic mean-
ings to the British, and the derelict harbour also possessed ‘natural potentials’ for
its development into a modern infrastructure. In the early days of the British
administration, the harbour was considered comparable to the great ports of
Alexandria and Valetta.24
Thus the technocratic policy of ‘one railway-one harbour’ was developed as a
means of applying the experience and expertise acquired in West Africa and match-
ing the technocratic vision with Chamberlain’s policy agenda. In the late 1880s and
1890s, Britain’s West African colonies experienced the implementation of mass
monoculture and the construction of railways terminating at particular ports. As
in Cyprus, these port constructions were mainly undertaken by Coode, Son and
Matthews Consulting Engineers working for the Crown Agents. The famous
Coode, Son and Matthews had been involved in colonial harbour projects, espe-
cially in West Africa. In the majority of these places where a railway was con-
structed by Shelford & Son, the connecting harbour was constructed by Coode,
Son and Matthews. It shared the fame of best known engineering firms with
Shelford and Son which undertook the same role in Cyprus for railway
construction.25
The Director of Public Works in Cyprus, Frank Cartwright, had been studying
the issue of the expansion and improvement of Famagusta Harbour since
September 1897.26 He had prepared a report for Walter Sendall, the High
Commissioner.27 The Colonial Office sought the opinion of the Crown Agents
who hired Coode, Son and Matthews as the consulting engineers for the harbour
scheme and were ordered to prepare a report.28 Mr P. M. Crosthwaite, an assistant
engineer in Coode, Son and Matthews, conducted the survey of the harbour during
the summer of 1898. By January of the next year the consultants’ report for the
Colonial Office specified the infrastructural characteristics, which differed from
previous technical reports. They suggested several minor design changes that
would result in a harbour would otherwise be unable to host two 400-foot iron
ships.29 This design detail was not given much attention, but in reality it resulted in
a harbour with an inner basin too narrow to accommodate prospective naval
traffic. The consultants also suggested the construction of a railway line from
Famagusta to Nicosia, advice typical for Coode, Son and Matthews. In West
Africa, this consulting company had designed many harbours which were also
served by railways that connected them with the hinterland.30 Chamberlain was
quick to follow the technocrats’ advice and by January 1902 he ordered the initi-
ation of the works with Coode, Son and Matthews as consulting engineers.31
The Famagusta harbour project proceeded smoothly and in accordance with the
engineers’ specifications. However, politics in Cyprus were becoming increasingly
Karas and Arapostathis 219
complex and tense. Wealthy and influential Larnacans, mostly the elected members
of the Legislative Council, were agitated by the news that their city would be denied
both a railway branch and harbour improvements. This was perceived as a threat
to their vested interests. Larnaca had a competitor which would supposedly have
superior and safer facilities, Government support, and a railway line terminating
there.32 In spite of this, no one could guarantee – even with the optimism of British
officials – that Famagusta would attract much of the trade for the island and a
share of the Levant trade by being the entrepôt of the region.
High Commissioner Haynes Smith, an active and interventionist colonial offi-
cer/politician, began negotiations to ameliorate the discontent and demands for a
railway, and hoped to achieve a resolution that would be acceptable to both
Chamberlain and the Larnacans.33 In October 1900, Haynes Smith wrote to
Joseph Chamberlain about the situation in Larnaca. He conveyed the general dis-
satisfaction amongst its townspeople and merchants, and the Elected Members,
both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike, about Larnaca’s exclusion from
the railway scheme. The letter was part of a policy strategy: Haynes Smith was
building a case for the improvement of the Larnaca harbour because he could
foresee the consequences of inaction on the subject. He understood the grievances
among local society and also perceived – rightly it proved – the high potential of a
governance crisis.34 Haynes Smith claimed that his proposal of improving the
harbour at Larnaca would both satisfy the demand for British ports in the
region, and placate the Larnacans and the Elected Members. He went onto
argue that if the improvements at Larnaca were added to the Locust Destruction
Bill which would allocate funds for paying the railway and Famagusta Harbour
loans, Elected Members would not object to passing the Bill.35
Chamberlain needed little persuading. He understood that the colonial power
would suffer heavily if the conflict with one of the most influential classes on the
Island persisted. As Chamberlain later explained to the Treasury, ‘it would be so
hard [for the Government] if Larnaca were to be excluded altogether from the
proposed schemes’.36 A compromise was reached between the Colonial Office,
the British Government, the local authorities and local elites. Elected Members
of the Legislative Council agreed to create funds from unpopular and non-
nationalistic sources, such as additional taxation of immovable property in the
town of Larnaca. On the one hand the Elected Members were making their first
compromise to the Government in the Larnaca Harbour case; on the other hand
they were engaging the Government and Colonial Office in the bargain.
In 1902, Larnaca’s political authorities and elites raised further complaints
about the exclusion of the city from the planned railway line.37 Earlier discussions
in the Legislative Council (of late 1890s and 1900–01) concerning the projects of the
railway and Famagusta Harbour had repeatedly brought up this issue of Larnaca’s
exclusion from the railway. This changed from 1902 to 1903 and Haynes Smith
took the initiative to extract some kind of promise from Chamberlain. Yet still the
tensions and local complaints about the necessity of Larnaca’s port improvements
persisted.38
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Haynes Smith showed his intentions concerning Larnaca port to Chamberlain in
his long despatch dated 7 September 1903. His objective was to persuade
Chamberlain to implement the Larnaca port improvements. The despatch finished
with the hot topic of local ‘resentment and annoyance’ which had been evident
throughout. It must be noted that this dispatch had been a product of Haynes
Smith’s close contacts, consultations and communications with the local elite at
Larnaca. As he discussed the estimates with the merchants and ‘those interested in
shipping’, he had come to terms with the political and economic leaders of the
region. These people within the social and economic hierarchy of Larnaca could
effect and mobilise people from the lower classes. Haynes Smith reminded
Chamberlain that the Famagusta Harbour and Railway had been perceived as
developments prone to severely injure Larnaca, the ‘ancient’ and the ‘best
known’ port of Cyprus, and he noted that exclusion would ‘leave a sore feeling’
in the community.39 Accordingly, the ‘Larnacan interests’ would secure better
means for their trade; the Government would contain and depress both a potential
political and social crisis, what Haynes Smith described as ‘. . . bitterness and hos-
tility to the British Administration’.40 The result of this canvassing was that a figure
of £15,000 was granted for the improvement of the Larnaca harbour, which would
be spent on lengthening the pier by 450 feet and adding a T-end. This would
provide more space for loading and unloading with slightly improved protection
from the surf whipped up by the winds. The design was trade-oriented rather than
passenger-oriented. It gave priority to trade activities by creating more space in the
harbour rather than being concerned with the security of passengers and labourers.
Fusing localism with the Unionist agenda
In the meantime, Greek nationalists of the Legislative Council incorporated
Government finances and expenditures at Famagusta Harbour into their nation-
alist agenda. In April 1903 the first official demand for ‘enosis’ (the union of Greece
and Cyprus) was made in the Legislative Council. The summer of 1903 witnessed
the offensive against the Government from the Legislative Council. The figure who
stood forward in the offensive was Dr Philios Zannetos, the Elected Member of the
Larnaca-Famagusta region.41 Zannetos was a notorious nationalist and a Greek
subject. In May 1903 the Legislative Council discussed the Famagusta Harbour
scheme for which the Elected Members had a series of complaints and demands.
Zannetos accused the Government over the character and design of the infrastruc-
ture while the colonial establishment viewed the accusations as ‘adverse criticism’
of the Government.42
On 21 July 1903 Zannetos presented a detailed and well-prepared complaint
against the Famagusta Harbour works. He claimed that the harbour would be a
‘sea-tank’ of no use. His complaint was twofold: first was the concern about
whether the design of the works would enable the harbour to serve the object
for which it was constructed, and the second was the cost of the project.
Zannetos argued that the design of the harbour would not allow harbouring of
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more than one steamer, of lengths ranging from 350 to 433 feet. He concluded by
accusing the Government of spending people’s money on a sea-tank – given
increasing vessel sizes, they should rather have invested in a harbour that could
become an emporium of the Levant.
Zannetos’ own calculations for the cost of the scheme were far lower than the
actual contract. He calculated £16,536 for the project and added, rather scathingly,
that he was ready to allow 50 per cent profit for the contractors. Zannetos built his
case to make a certain point; the Government was stealing from the people of
Cyprus. This was a provocative accusation at a time of severe economic hardship
and mass rural indebtedness. He said that the Government was generously giving
away the island’s money to British contractors who were making astronomical prof-
its while taxes were burdening the people of Cyprus. He stressed that the
Government would face consequences if it prioritized the harbour over possible
alternative schemes like the establishment of an Agricultural Bank. He further
argued that the establishment of an Agricultural Bank could be used in populist
politics in the face of the rural indebtedness ravaging the Cypriot peasantry. Cyprus
was an overwhelmingly agricultural economy in which usurers and moneylenders
were the only creditors, contributing heavily to indebtedness and dispossession of the
agriculturalist population. Zannetos’ criticisms gain yet more importance when one
considers that the majority of Cypriots farmed their own land.43
By Zannetos’ implicit utilisation of nationalist-populist politics, the story of
harbours in Cyprus began to shift between the spheres of technocracy and politics.
The governmental response came instantly. The High Commissioner asked for the
opinion of the Colonial Office which unsurprisingly sought a technocratic solution.
Coode, Son and Matthews were asked to report on the ‘ill-informed criticism’ of
the Government.44 The aim was to use the engineering report as an objective
defence of the situation and thus to shift away from the sphere of politics, the
direction in which Zannetos and the nationalists were driving the debate.
Engineering authority and expertise would have a mediating function in shaping
and legitimizing the government’s policy to politically split the local and nationalist
pressures. The consulting engineers argued that not only was their tender one of the
lowest in the Empire’s records, but that they had specifically received instructions
to keep expenditure low. The Famagusta harbour had been purposely designed on
a minimum-cost basis. Furthermore, Coode, Son and Matthews supported their
design priorities and practices by arguing that an area of 9 acres (500 feet by 800
feet) would provide ample room for the expected traffic and that any further exten-
sion was possible with infrastructure changes. They argued that the Famagusta
port had been designed as an open technological system that would accommodate
future commercial and shipping activities. The design foresaw only the satisfaction
of the traffic of Messaoria agriculture; it was neither Levant nor pan-Cyprian. This
was a departure from the visionary promises of the Colonial Office and the
Administration that the Famagusta scheme would create an entrepôt or emporium
of the Levant. Consultants framed the scheme along pragmatist lines in relation to
the expected traffic and mercantile load.45
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In a separate confidential letter, Haynes Smith informed Chamberlain about the
political agenda of Zannetos. Chamberlain’s technocratic visions collided with the
nationalist and financial interests. According to the High Commissioner, the attack
led by Zannetos on the Famagusta Harbour Works was a combination of local
interests and general policy among the unionists [enosists]:46
. . . the ‘‘unpleasant consequences’’ . . . are intended to mean an organized resistance to
the payment of the Locust Destruction Fund taxes, which are appropriated for part of
the charges of the Harbour and Railway Loan. They hope, I think, to unite all classes
in opposition to payment of any of the taxes which are in excess of the amount
expended in the Island . . .47
Haynes Smith understood what was being attempted in the Legislative Council.
The Locust Fund Tax and Tribute were sources of irritation for the whole popu-
lation of the Island. For a politician like Dr Zannetos it was an easy matter to lump
together the Locust Fund Tax, the Tribute and these projects in order to pursue his
objectives. This threat was one of the first attempts to use mass politics against the
British colonial administration.48 Famagusta Harbour was an easy target because
there were, as the High Commissioner noted, not only nationalist agendas but ‘also
strong local opposition of the Larnaca interests’.49 In the end Zannetos was not
articulating a purely enosis politics. Nationalist agenda and vested trade interests in
Larnaca were alternatively utilising one another’s ideas.
However, by 1904, just one year after Zannetos’ memorandum, Haynes Smith
had also come to the same conclusion: the new Famagusta harbour was too small
for ‘a convenient place of call’ for the steamships.50 He noted that different steam-
ship lines calling at Cyprus or engaging in trade in the Levant would not be willing
to dock at Famagusta unless its port was ‘somewhat enlarged’. The general opin-
ion, he continued, was in favour of making an extension 100 ft wide and 200 ft long.
He proposed these extensions together by bringing the railway onto the quay,
prolonging the wharf on iron piles from the quay to the land and dredging a
channel sufficiently deep to allow sailing vessels to use it.51 The Crown Agents
requested the advice of the consulting engineers once more. The latter also con-
fessed that the original design was ‘undoubtedly somewhat more cramped than is
desirable’.52 Their proposal, like that of the High Commissioner, was to lengthen
the quay and deep-water area by 100 ft, to widen the dredged area from 500 ft to
600 ft, to dredge a basin 15 ft in depth, and 450 ft 200 ft in size for small local
vessels at a new iron-jetty, in order not to interfere with steamships manoeuvring
inside the inner harbour. The design was accepted, the work was given to the
contractor CJ Wills, and the whole harbour project was completed by late 1906.
Confronting the contestation:
Improvements at Larnaca’s Port
The Government’s scheme to ease the discontent about Larnaca and the contest-
ation of its policy priorities by locals was to propose action which facilitated the
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repayment of a possible loan for improvements at the Larnaca port.53 The Larnaca
Port Loan Bill caused differences to surface between the Elected Members, but the
majority were in favour; even Zannetos was on the side of the Government.54
Zannetos, who alongside his political activities owned a tobacco factory in
Larnaca, acted in this instance for his business interests which overwhelmed his
nationalist sentiments. The Bishop of Kitium, a defender against the exploitation
of the Locust Destruction Fund and an influential populist figure in Larnaca, also
supported more taxation.55 Voting showed that those who were politically or eco-
nomically invested in Larnaca (including Zannetos) voted in favour, while those
opposed shared a more nationalist, anti-British profile, and generally belonged to
the cities of Nicosia and Limassol.56
The Larnaca Harbour improvements became part of the agenda of the new
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alfred Lyttelton, in early 1904. By February
1904 Haynes Smith was sending Lyttelton his proposal with a design and estimates
from his Director of Public Works, E. H. D. Nicolls. The Government, the
Municipality and ‘certain inhabitants’ of Larnaca all had their proposals ready
to be submitted for consideration by the Colonial Office. Since Lyttelton was
new to the Office, Haynes Smith, in his long despatch, had to refer to the necessity
of the improvements and their relation to the development of the Famagusta
Harbour and the funding of the project. In comparison to his dispatches to
Chamberlain, Haynes Smith was more honest with the new Secretary of State.
He considered that ‘to carry out what they do not want [would] only . . . be an
additional grievance and would be more resented than doing nothing’.57
Accordingly, he set the objective of the improvements for the facilitation of
trade and to giving the community of Larnaca what they required for the com-
merce of the town. Merchants wanted the improvements, so the improvements
would be trade-oriented. On the question of whether Famagustan trade would
suffer from the improvements in Larnaca, Smith believed that Famagusta’s success
depended only on whether ‘proper facilities’ are afforded to large ships to make the
city an entrepôt of the Levant trade.
Haynes Smith, eager to complete infrastructural improvements at Larnaca to
avoid the impending crisis, had enclosed both Nicolls’ and (Mayor of Larnaca)
Rossos’ memorandum. For the latter, he also asked Nicolls to calculate estimates
indicating his open willingness to forward the proposal of the Municipality
attached to its petition. The Government was now translating Larnacan interests
in technical terms as well. Nicolls, in his report, foresaw the extension of the pier
and the construction of a breakwater.58 He reported that heavy gales were never
experienced thus the anchorage was good and there was hardly a single day that
work had not been carried out at ships’ sides. According to Nicolls the difficulty
was the traffic arising from the in-shore surf, especially from winds blowing from
north or northeast.59 As the depth at the bottom of the port would not increase by
more than one to two feet, which did not make a significant difference to enabling
the anchorage of larger vessels, Nicolls did not propose a long extension of the pier
deep into the sea. Instead he added that the off-shore system of anchorage and
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carriage of merchandise and passengers by lighters to the pier during bad weather
should become more secure. Nicolls’ design prioritized the safety and security of
the trade.
Since the necessity was to protect lighters from bad weather, Nicolls’ proposed
to lengthen the pier by 200 ft (it was already a 450 ft long T-head) and, at a distance
of 75 ft from the end, construct a 430 ft breakwater at a distance of 125 ft seaward
from the pier.60 This would enable the T-head of the pier to be carried seaward
where a shoal existed, thus increasing protection, and the breakwater would enable
easier discharge to lighters and shelter to the latter at the pier. The whole project
was estimated to cost £15,000.
Mayor Rossos’ proposal had a different approach. As the situation became
more tense, even the length of the pier acquired meaning.61 Informed by pub-
lished Government data, previous reports and surveys and experience, Rossos’
memorandum asked for the fulfilment of two objectives: to clear the broken
water and avoid the surf which occurred at a distance of 1200–1250 ft from the
shore, and to obtain a depth of water of about 12 ft in order to allow small
vessels and lighter to work in any weather. Rossos’ design primarily provided
greater capacity and depth, together with increased security and an extension to
the length of pier.62 He left the calculation of the length of the pier and break-
water to the engineers’ ‘experience’. The memorandum ended with threatening
language that expressed the possible feelings that would be provoked by refusal
of the proposal. Rossos warned that if the breakwater was built at a depth of
nine feet, as in Nicolls’s plan, the people would perceive this as ‘parsimonious
and an unjust disregard of the town’.63
Nicolls modified his plans, based upon the memorandum of Rossos, and created
a hybrid design. He proposed extending 450 feet further seawards (as proposed by
Rossos) and slightly altering the direction of the breakwater which he had previ-
ously drawn.64 The estimated cost of these plans was £25,300, a fact which
Lyttelton disliked.65 Haynes Smith negotiated the plans; the result was a third
plan from Nicolls that had the scope to satisfy both the Larnacans in design and
Lyttelton in economics. Nicolls explained that his first plan was designed to give as
much as accommodation while keeping the cost within £15,000. However, in the
opinion of Mayor and the merchants of port of Larnaca, this did not give enough
space behind the breakwater. Thus, in order to satisfy the demand of Mayor and
merchants, who also had asked for comfort and safety for lighters, he increased the
length of breakwater from 550 ft, and placed it 50 ft further into the sea. This would
give an extra 50 ft between the breakwater and the pier head.66 Coode, Son and
Matthews were hired and directed to prepare the designs and estimates. Consistent
with their business conduct which typically erred on the side of caution when
financial estimates were involved, they estimated £28,000 for Nicolls’ third
design. They suggested accepting this design in principle with alterations to the
breakwater; they wanted to conduct an examination of the sea bed by special
boring, but the design included an extension of the pier by 200 ft with a T-head
and the construction of an isolated sheltering arm – breakwater – of 550 ft.67
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The Secretary of State was hesitant about continuing the scheme because he had
the dogma of one harbour-one railway in mind which demanded the concentration
of the flow of products/trade through the Famagusta Harbour, and so he prevented
the commencement of the Larnaca works.68 Amid rising tensions within the
Legislative Council and the political climate in Cyprus, Haynes-Smith was replaced
by the mildly philhellenic Sir Charles King-Harman who was more sympathetic
towards Greeks and their claims. His orders from the Colonial Office were to
persuade local politicians to co-operate and avoid a breakdown of governance
on the Island.69 The new High Commissioner, King-Harman, was as clear as his
predecessor Haynes Smith on the subject and followed his predecessor’s state
policy. He explained briefly that there was a general consensus that part of the
trade would always go to Larnaca. But, as far as the Mayor and the local mer-
chants were concerned, this story had become excessively prolonged. King-Harman
told Lyttelton that the disallowance was a major blow to Government efforts not
just in managing the Larnaca issue but in avoiding a governance crisis. He added
that this decision would cause consternation in the town, which had since laid
eloquent and indignant claims for the matter.70 The decision resulted in a
Memorandum from the Mayor of Larnaca on behalf of all Larnacans.71 The
High Commissioner presented this petition to the Colonial Office as ‘a temperate
expression of a strong feeling of bitterness and disappointment’.72
The Chamberlainian policy promoted the construction of the Famagusta
Harbour and the railway to secure an end to the island’s crisis. However, this
policy proved to only increase tensions on the island. The potential improvements
at Larnaca exacerbated the situation to a point the colonial establishment was
forced to reflect on and even question certain institutions, functions and practices
of island’s occupation. Two founding pillars of British presence were put on trial:
the Tribute and the Constitution (thus the Legislative Council). This former found-
ing pillar, the most important term of Ottoman-British agreement, was an institu-
tion which caused a source of burden and complaint for the entire population. The
Colonial Office took the initiative to negotiate with the Treasury a kind of financial
relief from the burdens of the Island, suggesting doing ‘something’ with the
Tribute. British official opinion saw these two as inter-connected. The Colonial
Office laid down two options for a solution to the crisis: an intervention in the
working of the Legislative Council in favour of official representation, or changing
the regime of Tribute.73 The Government had to do something: either to reward the
local political establishment by diminishing the Tribute, or punish it by diminishing
the local political representation on the Legislative Council. The issue of Larnaca
harbour improvements now pushed the British establishment to the point of a
possible governance breakdown. Only a few months before the petition, the
former High Commissioner Haynes Smith had suggested bringing in troops and
dissolving the Legislative Council.
As the stakes got higher, High Commissioner King-Harman made an emergency
official visit to Larnaca to meet, first, Mayor Rossos, and second, the ‘leading
people’ of the city: merchants, Elected Members of the Council and shipping
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agents.74 After his visit, King-Harman was yet more convinced about the need for
the improvements at Larnaca port. He noted that all parties agreed on the last
design proposed by the engineers.75 Lyttelton’s choice was between the further
escalation of the tension and making the position of the new High
Commissioner tenuous, or to approve his proposal. Lyttelton sanctioned the
scheme in January 1905 on the condition that funding had to be negotiated for
its type and source.76 His aim was to convince the Treasury to approve the scheme.
This would be the main discussion in 1905 about the Larnaca harbour
improvements.
Still no material progress was made in Larnaca’s case. A whole year had passed
since the Colonial Office approved the improvements, but since 1899 Larnaca had
been subject to discussions of railway and harbour building. Protests over the delay
were gathering speed. Agents of shipping companies were the first to complain.77
King-Harman, having met privately with Mayor Rossos and G. Pierides (both
elected members of the Legislative Council), wrote again to Lyttelton for immedi-
ate action in the summer of 1905. This petition letter had been a joint production
by Rossos, Pierides, and King-Harman, who noted that the insistence of Pierides
(also a shipping agent) had been the major motive. These were big trade interests
not just in Larnaca but on the whole Island. The High Commissioner had nothing
to add to his arguments, but just emphasized the possible outcome of a governance
breakdown in Cyprus:
. . . delay in the commencement of a work which received your approval so far back as
January last is fostering a spirit of resentment and discontent very detrimental to the
peaceful government of the Island.78
In the meantime, by December 1905 Lord Elgin of the Liberal Government had
become the head of the Colonial Office.79 The Secretary of State, Lord Elgin,
motivated by the ambivalence of the Treasury, requested a report by the consulting
engineers Coode, Son and Matthews. The issue at stake was how to reduce the cost
of the scheme. The consultants suggested a cheaper scheme that might omit the
covering breakwater or adopt some form of T-head to the pier instead of a break-
water to afford sufficient protection.80 In April 1906 the consulting engineers
conducted a new survey in Larnaca.81 In order to evaluate the situation and under-
stand the local dynamics, politics and priorities, they met with various interested
parties and social groups. These included the Director of Public Works (Nicolls),
the Collector of Customs of Larnaca, High Commissioner King-Harman, Mayor
Rossos, and agents of the principal shipping companies using the port. The visiting
engineer, Wilson, had to develop a design to the satisfaction of all. His design did
not differ greatly from Nicolls’s hybrid. It recommended lengthening the existing
jetty by 450 ft, which would give an additional depth of two feet, or eight feet in
sum, and to construct an outer sheltering arm 250 ft long to afford protection to the
outer end of the jetty.82 The cost was estimated at £21,500. This was the only
feature that concerned Lord Elgin. Elgin gave his approval on the condition that
the project would only take a small sum from the General Revenue; the London
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loans market now had disadvantageous terms of crediting. King-Harman ruled out
making Larnaca paying for the improvements, arguing that Elected Members and
people saw the payment as an obligation of the General Revenue, as in the cases of
Limassol, Famagusta and Kyrenia ports. He preferred the General Revenue to pay
the whole amount, a proposal, he considered, which would be agreed by the
Elected Members. As a direct consequence of the Larnaca improvements crisis,
Cyprus now had an increased amount of Grant-in-Aid from London. For the year
of 1908–1909 Cyprus was expecting £50,000 Grant-in-Aid.83 Consulting engineers
Coode, Son and Matthews had the difficult task of persuading the Treasury of the
feasibility of the scheme, arguing that Larnaca was no danger to Famagusta har-
bour’s interests. Both infrastructural projects had to be pursued as no real compe-
tition would emerge from the two harbour schemes.84 The Earl of Elgin approved
the scheme on the lines of Coode, Son and Matthews’ report, with the cost being
covered by an increased grant-in-aid during the next three years.85 By the end of
April 1907, plans were drawn up. Nicolls was appointed as the head of works under
the supervision and instruction of the Consulting Engineers.86 Tenders were also
accepted.87 By January 1908 the Larnaca harbour improvements ended with a full
execution of the contract. In the long-term, Larnaca got neither modern port
facilities nor a railway line. By 1926, Famagusta became the major port for all
imports and the main export route for agricultural products, the key objective of its
construction.88
Conclusion
Technological infrastructure and socio-political order were co-produced in early-
twentieth-century Cyprus through the agency of multiple actors: engineers, polit-
icians and members of Cyprus’ economically and politically most influential
classes. The Colonial Loans Act 1899 was a tool of Joseph Chamberlain’s ‘con-
structive imperialism’, aiming primarily to overcome the crisis of legitimization of
the British colonial order. Unlike colonies and protectorates in West Africa and the
West Indies, the policy in Cyprus primarily aimed at solving the crisis rather than
boosting economic growth for the British metropolitan welfare. The Famagusta
Harbour project, accompanied by railway and irrigation schemes, was part of this
policy but it faced resistance from the local political elite. Instead of resolving or
relieving growing dissatisfaction and crisis within the island, Chamberlain’s har-
bour and railway scheme exacerbated the crisis to a point that Cyprus became
ungovernable. For this reason, the two basic pillars of British colonial establish-
ment, The Tribute and the Gladstonian Constitution, were put under scrutiny to
manage this situation. The answer to this ongoing issue of governability came in
the form of an improved harbour in Larnaca. It was the material agency of the
improvement that finally made the local political elite give their consent to the
political structures of British colonialism.
Despite the strong technocratic visions and imperial experience, the emerging
port infrastructure in colonial Cyprus acquired specific technical characteristics
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through a continuous socio-political process of public negotiations with lobbies,
local politicians and authorities. Planning and developing colonial policies on trade
and transport, and building the relevant infrastructures, were not simple matters of
an unquestioned transfer of expertise and diffusion of technologies. The colonial
order based upon agricultural production and trade via modern infrastructures, as
conceptualized by Chamberlain’s policy, was enacted through tensions, pressures,
privileged local politics and understandings. Different conceptions of the future of
the Island emerged at a local level when Larnacans questioned the ‘rationality’ of
imperial technocratic plans. Coastal engineering plans and harbour design were
shaped by colonial policies and power struggles.
The improvement of Famagusta harbour was part of the colonial development
policy for Cyprus which, as a protectorate, was facing a socio-political and eco-
nomic crisis. It was decided to improve Famagusta Harbour and build a railway
terminus. Famagusta port possessed natural potentials of a grand harbour, and the
city filled British imagination with its past glory. It also stood at the eastern end of
the Messaoria plain which was to be served by the railway and supplied by irriga-
tion projects. In the British mind, financial constraints and technocratic visions
privileged Famagusta over Larnaca. Thus, if Cyprus was to be an ‘emporium’ of
the Levant, Famagusta needed to be enlarged to accommodate large steamers. This
policy targeted the concentration of the bulk of the Island’s export products at one
port: Famagusta Harbour. Accordingly, this policy excluded the Larnaca railway
branch, leaving powerful interested groups such as ship owners, merchants and
politicians in Larnaca feeling threatened. According to Chamberlain’s agenda the
railway and Famagusta Harbour projects were designed to answer Cyprus’ on-
going political and economic crisis. Yet the interpretation of these projects by
the colonial and imperial politicians and officials differed from the interpretations
of elites in Larnaca. Consequently, the colonial administration had to manoeuvre
between local elites and the Colonial Office in order to reach a consensus that
would satisfy both these parties. The consolidation of the colonial regime in
Cyprus depended also upon the reproduction of the local power relations that
were threatened by the modern infrastructures of the Nicosia-Famagusta railway
line and Famagusta Harbour. The consensus had to be translated into technical
improvements at Larnaca Harbour. The political compensation resulted in the
alteration and transformation of the ‘one harbour-one railway’ policy. Harbours
in the making reflected the techno-politics of the period. In this context visionary
technical solutions were translated into functioning infrastructure through contest-
ation, argumentation and negotiation among the interested parties and the relevant
social groups within Cyprus.
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